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Corporate law aims to mitigate conflicts of interest among corporate constituencies. Both 
legal scholars and lawmakers tend to assume that these are rational actors solely motivated by 
wealth maximization. Family firms, however, add more personal and less rational layers to the 
inquiry: On the one hand, family ties may enable a relationship of trust that reduces transaction 
and agency costs; on the other hand, the same intimacy and sentimentality may eventually create 
conflicts of interest among family members, make the firm vulnerable to changes in the family 
dynamic, or cause tensions between family and non-family shareholders. Successful family 
businesses have to integrate family and business governance—a job that, in many jurisdictions, is 
being unnecessarily complicated due to absence of proper corporate governance regimes 
supporting family businesses. 
From a Turkish perspective, this paper aims to discuss ways through which lawmakers 
may adopt family firm-friendly corporate governance regimes. The choice of jurisdiction is not 
incidental. In Turkey, where family firms play a crucial role in the national economy, there are no 
codes of governance or soft law measures specific to them. On the contrary, Turkish Commercial 
Code includes the principle of statute stringency that prohibits all deviations from legal 
provisions unless expressly permitted. Turkey serves as a good example to demonstrate the 
consequences of overlooking particularities of family firms. 
This paper has two central claims: First, it seeks to establish that lawmakers should 
prioritize default rules over mandatory ones so that family firms can tailor their articles of 
association to their unique circumstances through legal devices such as exit rights and share 
transfer restrictions. Second, it argues that in case of reluctance to negotiate legally binding 
instruments due to fear of impairing ties of trust and intimacy, non-binding family constitutions 
should be encouraged as an alternative. 
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